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"AWAKENING THE CONSCIENCE
OF THE MASSES"
The Vietnamese Confederation of
Labour, 1947-75
Edmund Wehrle

In 1948, Gilbert Jouan, a French colonial customs officer with twenty
years' experience in Indochina and an abiding faith that trade unions
would form a bulwark against Communist intrusion, took the first tentative
steps toward organizing Vietnamese workers. Working with the French
Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC), Jouan and other Catholic
trade unionists in 1947 formed a "delegation" representing CFTC interests
in Vietnam, and notified French authorities of his intention to organize
"an authentic Christian trade union in Indochina . . . for the Indochinese
themselves". 1
Strictly speaking, Jouan's actions violated the law. Trade unions,
explained one colonial official in 1948, had "absolutely no legal standing;
groups such as these are merely tolerated by public officials". 2 Still, the
French invested great hope in Jouan's work. An official report on Christian
trade union organizing described Jouan as "worthy of our esteem". The
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colonial government even arranged time off from the customs office
for Jouan so that he could focus on the organizing work that officials
obviously hoped would counterbalance the appeal of the Viet Minh. 3
"The consolidation of the support of the working class in Vietnam is
mainly to be achieved by close collaboration with the Christian Trade
Union", explained the Vietnamese Minister of Social Action. 4 The result
was an awkward modus vivendi between the nascent, still-illegal labour
organization and the colonial state.
Within a few years, Jouan's Christian labour movement grew in
numbers and clout, and eventually took the name the Confederation
Vietnamienne du Travail Chretien (Vietnamese Confederation of Christian
Workers, known best by its French acronym, CVTC). The organization
had far-reaching ambitions - to be an activist and independent voice
for the oppressed workers of Vietnam. Its survival for the next twoand-a-half decades remains a testament to the skill and commitment of
its leadership and rank-and-file. Likewise, frequent strikes, workplace
actions, and political activism sponsored by the confederation suggest a
genuine militancy on the part of South Vietnam's unions and workers.
Yet true autonomy and independence of action in South Vietnam proved
virtually impossible to maintain. In order to survive, the CVTC entered
into compromising alliances with the French (described above) and a
succession of problematic Saigon governments. This awkward balancing
act between serving the interests of the state and acting aggressively on
behalf of workers plagued the CVTC throughout its existence - and
in some ways represents the central paradox facing today's labour
movement in Vietnam. In the case of the CVTC, this limitation proved
an insurmountable handicap.
This chapter discusses at length the CVTC's ill-fated struggle to
preserve its autonomy. It explores the history of the organization from its
inception (depicted in the opening vignette) to its end in 1975 as Saigon
fell to the North Vietnamese. Understandably, an organization dedicated
to mobilizing workers and remaking society faced an uphill struggle
during the colonial era. Obstacles impeding the CVTC, however, further
increased under the repressive Diem regime, which sought to harness South
Vietnamese labour for its own political purposes. Ngo Dinh Diem's death
and the U.S. intervention portended better days. The CVT (Vietnamese
Confederation of Labour; the term "Christian" was later dropped from the
Western translation) made great advances in the mid-1960s, organizing
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throngs of workers and negotiating beneficial contracts, especially with
U.S. employers. However, while it sought to avoid conflict with Saigon
government officials, labour-state tensions simmered. Seeking tighter control
as war ravaged the country, state officials grew increasingly suspicious
of a movement with its own agenda of empowering the lower classes.
Rumours swirled constantly that the National Liberation Front (NLF or
Viet Cong) had infiltrated the labour organization. These tensions came to
a head in 1968, when the government moved to break a strike initiated
by CVT militants.
Despite the devastating strike and the equally challenging Tet Offensive
of 1968, the CVT managed to recover. It remained an active force, entering
politics in the late 1960s and contributing to major legislative reforms,
including the 1971 Land-to-the-Tiller Act. Still, caution - a reluctance
to push its government and its American allies too far - continued to
characterize the organization to its demise in 1975.
For the most part, scholars have overlooked the struggles of the CVT
- despite its impressive membership numbers and political successes. 5
This is partly due to a lack of sources. With most CVT records apparently
destroyed in 1975, researchers are forced to tease out information from
available sources, including a 1969 official history of the CVT, U.S. and
French government documentation, and oral interviews with surviving
members. The contested and politicized atmosphere surrounding the
Vietnam War also presents challenges to telling the full story of an
organization caught between historical currents. Indeed, despite a paucity
of evidence, several scholars have dismissed the CVT as a pawn of
the brutal Saigon government and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). As immediate memories of the divisive war fade, one hopes
that balanced treatments, neither vilifying nor sanctifying the CVT, will
emerge - providing the integrated treatment this fascinating movement
deserves.

THE LABOUR QUESTION IN VIETNAM
While the tortuous history of organized labour in South Vietnam - the
focus of this chapter - began in the waning days of French colonialism,
the "labour question" in Vietnam had deep roots. From the earliest days of
French rule, rapacious labour practices in Indochina, especially conditions
on rubber plantations, where workers toiled often as little more than slaves,
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drew international rebukes and violent resistance from Vietnamese workers.
The worldwide economic crisis of the 1930s - felt deeply in Vietnam
- lent new urgency to the issue. Reformers and radicals alike focused
on organizing workers as a defence against the ravages of capitalism
and colonialism. Throughout the decade, strikes at rubber plantations,
smaller industries, and Saigon's docks presented a constant challenge to
the French, who often launched brutal counteroffensives.
As tensions smouldered, the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of
colonialism, rooted in a blistering critique of labour exploitation, gained
a growing following. In 1929, activists founded the Red Federation of
General Unions and in 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party. 6 While
earlier nationalist campaigns focused on the small, educated elite of
Vietnam, Communists targeted the country's proletariat (numbering roughly
200,000, including small factory employees, shipyard workers, and coal
miners) and the large masses of the peasants in their recruitment drive. 7
By the late 1930s, French authorities began to shift tactics somewhat. In
1936, a reform-minded "Popular Front" government under Prime Minister
Leon Blum came to power in Paris. Blum introduced a broad program of
reform legislation granting new rights to colonial workers. Labour unions,
however, remained illegal. 8
Blum's government fell quickly, but colonial leadership in Vietnam
remained in transition. During Second World War, the Axis-allied Vichy
government took over in Indochina, but its hold remained fragile. The
Japanese presence grew, while anticolonial groups coalesced into the
umbrella organization known as the Viet Minh in 1941, which opposed
both the French and Japanese.
With the defeat of Japan in August of 1945, Viet Minh leader
Ho Chi Minh seized on the power vacuum to declare an independent
Vietnam. The labour question quickly emerged to play a central role in
Ho's initiatives. Announcing the creation of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945, Ho Chi Minh set about organizing
workers into what he foresaw as "one big union'', the Vietnam Federation
of Trade Unions (VFTU), modelled on the French Confederation Generale
du Travail (CGT). After initial Viet Minh successes, the French moved
to reassert authority, and by late 1946 the first Indochina War was under
way. As a result, the VFTU made little headway either in the South or
in Vietnam's cities still controlled by the French. 9 Even so, by 1949 the
VFTU could boast some 258,000 members. 10
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BUU AND THE BIRTH OF THE CVTC UNDER
FRENCH COLONIALISM
As the French struggled against increasing Viet Minh resistance, Jouan
began his work in the South with the welcome addition of an energetic
nationalist named Tran Quoc Buu. From his teens, Buu, who hailed from
Binh Dinh Province in central Vietnam, devoted himself to the nationalist
cause. In 1940, French authorities sentenced him to a lengthy term at
Poulo Condore island prison. Following his release in 1945, Buu fought
alongside the Viet Minh. After a time, disillusioned by Viet Minh excesses,
Buu met Jouan, who quickly became his mentor. 11
In particular, Jouan taught the virtues of corporatist labour relations,
stressing the utility of chambres mixtes de metiers, or trade councils,
in which employers, employee representatives, and local and national
government authorities would meet and jointly make management decisions
- ideas strongly promoted in Christian trade union circles as alternatives
to radical socialism. 12 Despite their interest in such tripartite arrangements,
Buu and Jouan stressed that labour unions must be separate independent
forces, acting solely in the interests of their membership. Buu believed
that he had found a "third force" capable of unifying and reconstructing
Vietnamese society non-violently. This ideology remained at the core of
his movement until 197 5 - although circumstances, especially a hostile
state and employers, thwarted any real implementation of such corporate
labour arrangements.
Disregarding legal prohibitions, Buu and Jouan launched an aggressive
campaign to organize workers and recruited approximately 8,000 members
by the end of 1950. The organization quickly grew to include at least ten
'illegal' unions, representing the employees of Citroen and the airline Air
Vietnam, as well as shoemakers, typesetters, tailors, and barbers. 13
French authorities, while tolerating the burgeoning labour movement,
at times sought to circumscribe its activities. For instance, colonial officials
denied Buu's petition to hold a public demonstration on 1 May 1950,
in honour of May Day. Manifesting a determined militancy, Buu and
his fellow budding unionists instead organized a "requiem mass" at the
Cathedral of Saigon. Following services, union leaders directed members
to the federation's headquarters where they approved a series of resolutions
to be presented to the government. Demands included new labour codes
decriminalizing labour unions, the closure of a Cholon gambling house,
and an end to the subcontracting system at Saigon's port. 14
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In 1952, under pressure from Viet Minh gains, Bao Dai, the head of
state installed in 1949 by the French to allow the Vietnamese limited selfgovernment, finally issued a new series of labour regulations which at last
permitted workers to organize. 15 The decrees generated strong opposition
from Vietnam's bourgeoisie, both French and Vietnamese. Nonetheless, the
Bao Dai government and French officials clung fatuously to hopes that the
reforms might generate support among the working classes for Bao Dai's
struggling government. 16
Buu and Jouan, seizing on their newly legal status, officially named
their organization the Vietnamese Confederation of Christian Workers. 17
Perhaps to appeal to non-Christian workers, the organization did not use
the designation of "Christian" in the Vietnamese name (Tong Lien Doan
Lao Cong Vietnam). From the start, the CVTC focused considerable
energy on recruiting rural workers, especially plantation workers and
tenant farmers; the organization's rural unions quickly became and would
remain the confederation's largest constituency, since the population was
overwhelmingly involved in rural activities. It was estimated a little over
a year later that the CVTC's membership had grown to 38,990, including
around 1,300 unionists in Hanoi. 18 Despite the organization's ties to the
International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU), Christians
remained in the minority. Officially, the CVTC "was open to all workers"
and set out to attract a diverse membership, inclusive of all religious and
minority groups. 19
While on the one hand seeking to maintain peace with French and
Vietnamese authorities, on the other the CVTC strove to maintain an active
militancy. In 1953, the CVTC initiated strikes by employees of Air France,
500 shoemakers in Cholon, and workers in the five largest printing houses
in Saigon. That same year, when government officials in the north moved
to curb CVTC operations, Buu and Jouan protested loudly, "unleashing a
violent campaign in the press for trade union freedom". 20
The awkward dance between labour and colonial state, however,
would soon be over. French colonialism was on its last legs by 1953,
and CVTC officials began preparing for its aftermath. The organization
adamantly opposed the temporary division of Vietnam mandated by the
Geneva Accords in July 1954. Banners strung across the confederation's
headquarters denounced the Geneva Accords with slogans such as "To
Divide Vietnam is to Open the Door of Southeast Asia to Communism". 21
In particular, Buu and Jouan feared for the fate of the CVTC's northern
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affiliates. CVTC-affiliated workers at the Cai-Da mines in northern
Vietnam launched a successful work stoppage in early 1954. The strike
enhanced Buu's reputation and fed hopes for further organization in the
more industrialized north. 22 Within a year, however, as feared, distressing
news began to pour in from the north of persecution and union-breaking,
including reports that the DRV government in the north, apparently viewing
the CVTC as subservient to Western colonialism, had sentenced trade
unionists to forced labour on the Chinese border. 23 The CVTC was "living
though a real nightmare", an unnerved Buu wrote to a supporter. 24
As the CVTC struggled, the VFTU became the sole legal union for all
workers in the north. While serving as a representative agency for workers,
the VFTU also served the state, mobilizing, training, and disciplining
workers. It has remained closely associated with the Communist Party to
this day. 25

COOPERATING WITH
NGO DINH DIEM
Seeking to accommodate itself to new circumstances, the CVTC underwent
important changes. Jouan, perhaps recognizing that a labour organization
headed by a former colonial official would send the wrong message,
decided to return home to France and leave the movement in the hands
of Vietnamese, in particular Buu. CVTC officials also began seeking the
leverage of new alliances as life grew more dangerous and complicated
- alliances that would prove enormously problematic. The organization
made contact with the CIA, establishing a long-lasting, shadowy relationship. 26 Additionally, despite the organization's avowed commitment to
independence, the CVTC cautiously embraced the rising ambitions of Ngo
Dinh Diem and his politically ambitious family, after Diem was appointed
prime minister by Bao Dai in June 1954. As early as 1954, the French
CFTC described the Ngos as "already for a long time having exercised a
useful and discreet influence" on the CVTC. 27 Buu joined the Ngo family
in forming the Can Lao Party (Revolutionary Personalist Labour Party),
which Diem envisioned as his chief vehicle for promoting both social
reform and his own control over the country. 28 Yet relations between the
CVTC and Diem always retained a certain tension. On several occasions
Buu and other labour leaders publicly blasted Diem for the latter's efforts
to co-opt the confederation. 29
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Still, the CVTC supported Diem during the pivotal Battle of Saigon
in 1955. With Diem firmly in power, the ranks of labour grew, as
did organizing campaigns. The Tenant Farmers' Federation expanded
dramatically under the personal patronage of Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's
brother and chief political advisor. 30 By late 1955, the CVTC publicly
claimed half a million members, although privately it admitted to the
still-substantial figure of around 350,000. 31 The confederation expanded
membership services, opening several consumer cooperatives and ambitiously planning a "worker city" to provide low-cost housing and services
for urban workers. 32 It moved to set up chambres mixtes de metiers
arrangements and to open a series of "Raiffeisen Cooperatives", modelled
on the rural savings and loans associations begun by Friedrich Raiffeisen
in Germany in the 1860s.33
The clashing visions of the Ngo family and the CVTC, however,
could not be suppressed. Diem clearly intended to control the organization,
while the CVTC remained determined to preserve its autonomy. Buu told
confidants he was "reluctant to become over-obligated" to the government
by "accepting outright grants from it or any of the political parties". 34 In
a meeting with the president in February 1956, Buu bluntly told Diem
that "his idea of democracy was not [Diem's] hand-picked assembly". 35
The CVTC followed up by amplifying its attacks on local officials who
harassed union members. Such brazen outspokenness stoked the fires of
Diem's and Nhu's obsessive suspicions. The final straw, according to U.S.
Embassy observers, came when the CVTC failed to pass a resolution
pledging support to Diem's government. 36 By late autumn 1956, Nhu
unleashed a hostile campaign against the CVTC, targeting in particular
the Tenant Farmers' Union. Soon rumours swirled that authorities planned
to arrest Buu himself. 37
Over the next several years, relations worsened. Soon Diem had
virtually rendered the CVTC an organization in name only, and its
agenda had largely stalled. Increasingly, Buu relied on his CIA ties and
other American friends to offset the threat of the Ngos. Buu complained
bitterly to allies in the CIA of recent arrests of CVTC officials designed
to "intimidate labour", and warned that workers were growing "restive",
some being attracted to Buddhist calls for a general strike against Diem. 38
In early autumn of 1963, he went public with complaints about the Diem
presidency, sharply criticizing the Ngos before a United Nations committee
investigating Vietnam. 39
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Clearly, Buu had ties to those conspiring against Diem, but if the
CVTC leadership hoped that labour-state relations would improve following
the coup resulting in Diem's killing in November 1963, they were sorely
disappointed. The new Saigon government took Buu into custody, apparently
concerned over his previous ties to the Diem regime. Only the personal
intercession of the U.S. embassy allowed for his release. 40

TOWARD THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR
For several months, the CVTC waited for the tumult sweeping South
Vietnamese politics to settle. By early 1964, a new government had been
formed under General Nguyen Khanh. Again the U.S. embassy aided
organized labour's cause by pushing Khanh to meet directly with Buu, a
meeting where the two worked out an agreement allowing the CVTC vital
room to organize. 41 By the mid-1960s, key U.S. officials clearly had come
to view the CVTC as prime evidence of emerging democracy in Vietnam
- evidence they could use to support intervention, as the White House
and Congress began pondering the future of South Vietnam.
Seizing the newly liberalized atmosphere, the CVTC embarked on a
flurry of new organizational activity. The plantation and tenant farmers'
unions, decimated by Diem, rebounded as tens of thousands of Vietnamese
farmers and workers joined CVTC-affiliated unions. 42 Seeking to broaden
international support, Buu's federation dropped the term "Christian" from
the Western translations of the confederation's title and was known from
then on as the CVT, although it retained its affiliation with the Christian
International. 43 Buoyed by success, in mid-1964, a CVT cadre ecstatically
declared at a Singapore labour conference: "The activities of our syndicate
are not like a thatch fire, burning for a short time and often dying out.
But on the contrary, her activities persist like a coal fire under a layer
of ashes". 44
In the summer of 1964, a protracted conflict with the American-born
Chinese owner ofVimytex textile factory provided Buu with an opportunity
to stoke some of the ashes. Typical of the Asian textile industry, Vimytex,
purchased with a US$6 million loan from the U.S. Operations Mission
(USOM), had a reputation for dismal labour conditions. 45 Foreign-owned
and linked to the Americans, Vimytex offered a tempting target - an
opportunity for the CVT to play on mounting anxieties about expanding
outside influence in South Vietnam. The mill owner, however, showed no
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signs of acceding to workers' demands. Eventually he locked out threequarters of his workers, roughly 120 employees, and transferred others to
a military camp. 46
As the CVT mobilized, General Khanh suddenly threatened the
campaign. On 19 August 1964, amid growing political chaos, the general
declared a state of emergency, partly in reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin
incident, but also to quell mounting protests in the streets of Saigon.
Assuming total authority, Khanh banned all strikes and mass meetings. 47
Once again the state was determined to threaten labour advances.
In response, Buu upped the ante by announcing a general strike to
involve all labour unions in Saigon. A general strike would demonstrate
to all of Vietnam the independence and potency of the CVT. 48 "We have
arrived at a point where we must take chances. We are taking this one
now with the conviction that for the world of labour we represent the
only solution outside Communism," Buu explained to French journalist
Jean Lacouture. 49
On 21 September 1964, the CVT shut down Saigon. With the city's
electrical workers joining the strike, South Vietnam's capital city sat in
darkness for a full day, without water, electricity, phone services, or bus
transportation. Sixty thousand CVT members joined in the work stoppage.
Buu led a parade of several thousand strikers through Saigon to Khanh's
offices where they presented their demands. With the general conveniently
out-of-town, his aides negotiated with strike leaders.so Thousands of workers
waited outside for news of the deliberations. Finally, to great fanfare, Buu
appeared, announcing a tentative settlement easing labour restrictions.s 1
Impressed by the militancy of Saigon workers, Lacouture wondered if
the one-day mobilization marked the emergence of a potential third force:
"For the first time a force arose that could be either a possible replacement
for the present regime or a link to the enemy regime or the first pillar of
a regime to come."s2 Buu's organization, however, was badly overextended
- especially with regard to its relations with Saigon officials. While
dramatically asserting itself, the CVT created new enemies and infuriated
old ones. Buddhists as well as Buu's foes within the labour movement
now viewed the confederation as a surging threat. More seriously, the CVT
moved to the top of General Khanh's enemy list. Then on 10 October,
General Khanh included Buu's name on a list of thirteen military officers
and seven civilians to be arrested on charges of conspiring against Khanh
in a failed coup on 13 September. s3
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Fortunately for Buu, on 22 October a military court, no doubt
responding to pressure from the U.S. embassy, found him innocent of all
charges; loud cheers reverberated through the courtroom when his acquittal
was announced. 54 Following his exoneration, Buu sidestepped any direct
condemnation of Saigon officials, doubtless understanding that he still
depended on the state for survival. He still expressed the hope that the
verdict signalled a new openness to democratic governance, and that Khanh,
at last, was "ready to show sincere comprehension and cooperation with a
free and independent labour organization in the national struggle". 55
While the CVT had made remarkable gains since the fall of Diem,
it obviously remained subject to a number of pernicious forces. First and
foremost was the Saigon government, but there were also divisions within
the trade union movement. While it was the largest and most influential
labour organization in South Vietnam, it was not the only one. Upstart
organizations, such as a military-led effort to organize longshoremen on
Saigon's piers, presented constant annoyances - always presenting a threat
but never rising to a substantial challenge. 56 A former CVT officer, Bui
Luong, who had had a severe falling-out with the organization and formed
a rival group, constantly hurled accusations at Buu, at one point charging
him with accepting US$200,000 from the North Vietnamese to build a house
and simultaneously with pocketing US$45,000 from the U.S. embassy. 57
Meanwhile, in early 1965, the Buddhist Institute for Secular Affairs began
organizing workers. Quickly, the institute attempted to launch general strikes
in several cities, including Hue, Quang Tri, and Da Nang. 58
Even greater trials followed in 1965. Khanh fell from power, eventually
to be replaced by a government headed by Air Marshall Nguyen Cao
Ky as prime minister. Buu and the CVT concluded that the new prime
minister considered them an enemy. Ky, they feared, meant to "thwart, if
not destroy, the CVT". 59 The full-scale U.S. military intervention in the
summer of 1965, fully endorsed by the CVT, also presented challenges
and opportunities. With ever-growing leverage over the South Vietnamese
leadership, the Americans, very much aware of the need to make South
Vietnam appear democratic, pushed Ky to work with organized labour.
Thrown on the defensive, Ky soon was insisting that his government was
both "pro-worker and pro-peasant". 60 Again, a temporary modus vivendi
allowed the CVT to continue its work.
The CVT leadership gained new appreciation for Ky when the prime
minister moved against Buddhist protesters in Da Nang. 61 The Buddhist
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Institute's drive to organize workers, of course, helped persuade trade
unionists of the need for Ky's hard line; the CVT hoped to organize all
workers, and competition from the upstart Buddhists was not appreciated.
In August 1966, following decisive anti-Buddhist raids in Da Nang and
Hue, the CVT invited Ky to its headquarters as its honoured guest. There,
500 unionists greeted the prime minister as a hero, interrupting Ky's speech
with applause ten times. 62
Buu's improved relationship with the national government allowed the
CVT yet another opportunity to expand. In particular, the Tenant Farmers'
Federation, a key CVT affiliate, flourished, expanding to nearly 100,000
members. At times, the Tenant Farmers competed directly with the Viet
Cong for the loyalty of farmers and farm labourers. In early 1965, Viet
Cong guerrillas, relying heavily upon violence and intimidation, drove
away the French management of South Vietnam's largest rubber plantation
in Binh Duong Province. The Viet Cong, however, quickly proved unable
to pay or feed workers. A "delegation of workers therefore made their
way to Saigon", where the CVT tenant farmers took up their cause, and
successfully negotiated a new contract with Michelin. 63

CAUGHT BETWEEN UNION MILITANTS
AND THE STATE
Its entente with Ky, however, hardly made up for the myriad challenges
facing the CVT. As U.S. soldiers swept into the country, so too did painful
inflation. The meagre wages paid to South Vietnam's workers, especially
its rural workers, lagged behind rising prices, soaring at an annual rate of
124 per cent in 1966. 64 The CVT also remained at the mercy of the
police. Buu openly worried that General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, the nearpsychotic head of the national police, would kill him and blame it on the
Viet Cong. 65
It was in fact a clash with General Loan that set off the next big
challenge facing the CVT - an episode that almost shattered organized
labour in South Vietnam. While the CVT had grown tremendously since
1963, especially organizing campaigns on behalf of Vietnamese employed
by Americans, the confederation worked to avoid direct confrontations
with government-owned operations and Republic of Vietnam officials,
especially the Saigon police. CVT leaders fully understood the mercurial
nature of their government, but the organization's reluctance to take on
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the state irked many younger members eager to press democratization and
workers' rights.
The first sparks of labour-state conflict flared in the summer of 1967
when the French-owned Compagnie des Eaux et d'Electricite (CEE) agreed
to transfer operation and control of a large power plant serving Saigon to
the South Vietnamese government. 66 Plant employees anticipated job losses,
and the CVT-affiliated Water and Electricity Workers Union demanded a
fair severance package for those who became unemployed. For employees
who would remain, the union demanded a 12 per cent pay hike. When
concessions failed to materialize, workers threatened to strike. Vo Van Tai,
leader of the CVT's militant "young Turks" and chief of Saigon's labour
council, aggressively pushed the electrical workers to take a strong stand.
Buu obviously preferred moderation but feared stifling the ambitions of
militants in his ranks. 67
Both the CVT and state officials briefly put the mounting conflict
aside as national elections won by General Nguyen Van Thieu consumed
the country, but almost immediately thereafter the smouldering conflict
returned. Seeing no signs of concessions from the government, Tai and
CVT radicals scheduled a strike for early in the new year. On 30 December
1967, General Loan issued a communique declaring that the National
Police would "no longer refrain from intervention in the growing number
of strikes". 68 Ignoring the general, on 11 January 1968 1,000 power plant
employees walked off the job. 69
A few hours after declaring the strike, the CVT Saigon Labour Council
arrived at the Labour Ministry's offices to open negotiations. Suddenly
Loan's men burst into the room, and arrested six labour leaders, including
Vo Van Tai. 70 Word of the arrests spread rapidly, and sympathy strikes
broke out across Saigon. Bus drivers quit their routes, and longshoremen
abandoned the ports. 71 However, these protests only spurred Loan to take
harsher action. He loaded five garbage trucks with police, directed the
convoy to CVT headquarters, and personally delivered "requisitions",
ordering workers back to their jobs immediately. Police ripped down
strike banners and arrested any who dared resist. Loan's violent reputation
persuaded enough workers to return to their jobs to allow the electrical
plant to reopen at full capacity. In the wake of Loan's crackdown, sympathy
strikes petered out, but bitterness remained. 72
Never enthusiastic about the strikes, Buu privately blamed CVT
militants and moved to negotiate a settlement with the government before
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the upcoming Tet holidays. On 16 January he ordered remaining strikers
back to work. In return, the Saigon government agreed to a 12 per cent
pay increase, and General Loan released the labour leaders still in his
custody, including Vo Van Tai. 73
An uneasy stillness settled across the Saigon labour scene, but the
Viet Cong, who had been applauding the strikes through radio propaganda,
warned that "(o Jn the eve of Tet, the stormy fire of revolutionary struggle
of our workers and labourers will kindle fiercely right in the cities". 74 Only
days later, the Viet Cong launched its Tet Offensive. As the conflagration
spread, swelling violence destroyed the homes of more than 1,000 trade
unionists.
Militant CVT members argued that, in light of the government's recent
suppression, the confederation should assume a stony silence, sending
authorities a pointed message. Again the organization faced a tough decision,
weighing activism against good relations with its government. Buu and the
CVT leadership decided to focus on the immediate terrorist threat from the
Viet Cong and support their government. The organization issued a sharp
condemnation of the "criminal action of the enemy". 75
If the CVT hoped to be rewarded for its loyalty, it was sorely
disappointed. As the dust settled in Saigon, General Loan rearrested a
key trade union leader. The police action mystified Buu, who could only
speculate that Loan "must be insane". 76 Another round of interventions
by Buu and his American allies finally effected the release of the jailed
CVT official.
Despite the extreme setbacks of the first half of 1968, the roller
coaster pattern that defined the CVT's existence persisted. Following
the Tet Offensive, the CVT managed to expand its influence, defying all
expectations. Surprisingly, the CVT also found its relations with Saigon
authorities improving, especially with the retirement of General Loan, who
had suffered a severe injury in a Viet Cong rocket attack. 77 Likewise, as
the Viet Cong retreated following what was certainly a military defeat,
confederation organizers expanded their rural activities. "The sky was
bright again after several months of tempest", a CVT official explained. 78
The South Vietnamese economy entered into a brief period of economic
expansion, especially in the countryside. 79
The CVT also continued aggressively to organize Vietnamese employed
by the U.S. military and associated contractors - a workforce that at its
peak included several hundred thousand workers, who were among the best
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paid in South Vietnam. The American military, with its focus on nationbuilding and winning "hearts and minds", sought to avoid confrontation
with its Vietnamese employees at all costs. Likewise, informed by a New
Deal worldview, official U.S. policy encouraged unionization. To this end,
the military established a single agency, the Office of Civilian Personnel
(OCP), to oversee labour relations with all employees. From the start, the
OCP faced a restless, often militant workforce. While American employees
signed a no-strike pledge, Vietnamese workers showed little reluctance to
walk off jobs. Hundreds of wildcat and CVT-sanctioned strikes plagued the
U.S. military and associated contractors throughout the war. Most related
to wage issues, as inflation swept across the South Vietnamese economy,
but issues of safety, treatment of employees, and the hiring of so-called
third country nationals (usually Koreans or Taiwanese) also caused worker
protest. Seeking to avoid full-scale labour conflict, the OCP tolerated brief
strikes and worked hard, increasingly in alliance with the CVT, to appease
its workforce. 80

"AWAKENING THE CONSCIENCE OF THE MASSES":
TOWARD POLITICS
Even as CVT members relied upon the Americans for jobs in a labourfriendly environment, many in both the rank-and-file and leadership
recognized that South Vietnam's heavy dependence on outsiders was
a double-edged sword that delegitimized their country as much as it
represented a necessary lifeline. They looked forward to the promise of
Vietnamization. An American departure, Buu optimistically forecasted,
would inspire an "awakening of the conscience of the masses". 81
Recognizing that its chief vulnerability was its often-tense relationship with Republic of Vietnam government officials, the CVT, which long
eschewed direct involvement in politics, began testing the political waters.
In 1968, breaking with precedent, it joined in forming a coalition called
Lien Minh Dan Toe Cach Mang Xa Hoi (National Alliance for Social
Revolution), composed of several political and ethnic parties, including
Catholics, the Hoa Hao religious sect, the CVT, and Senator Tran Van Don
(a perennial political player and one of the plotters of the 1963 coup against
Diem). 82 From behind the scenes, President Nguyen Van Thieu encouraged
the development, arguing that the alliance would bring political stability
and, presumably, political security for himself. 83 The alliance, however, fell
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apart quickly, largely due to diverging ambitions of all parties and Thieu's
meddling efforts to control the political organization. 84
Undaunted, the CVT leadership moved to organize the Cong-Nong Party
(the Worker-Farmer Party), a political party to represent the confederation's
interests. Established in November 1969, Cong-Nong was purported to be an
entity independent from the CVT, yet its connection to the labour movement
was obvious - essentially an open secret. 85 Borrowing the CVT's pluralistic
aims of uniting farmers, labourers, urban workers, minority groups, and
various religious sects, Buu proposed to include a diverse conglomeration
of largely underrepresented groups, possibly including his old allies in the
religious organization Cao Dai, in his new political party. 86
The CVT's political venture did enjoy considerable success. Using
CVT unions and social centres as a base, the Cong-Nong Party, which
aimed to train a cadre corps of some 3,000 organizers, quickly spread to
forty provinces and many cities. Voters elected Cong-Nong Party candidates
to seats in the General Assembly and local offices. 87 From positions of
influence, Cong-Nong pressed such measures as civilian military training
(with the aim of mobilizing South Vietnamese against Communists) and
the 1971 Land-to-the-Tiller Act, which proposed to transfer three million
acres of prime farmland in the Mekong Delta and central lowlands from
landlords to tenant families. 88 The CVT seemed on the verge of becoming
a major political force with its populist, reformist agenda.
By the end of 1971, however, progress seemed to stall. Inflation became
an ever-greater problem, and unemployment rose as refugees filled South
Vietnam's cities. The U.S. drawdown of troops and investment in Southeast
Asia worsened the situation, as thousands of Vietnamese employed by
Americans lost their jobs.
Meanwhile, the CVT faced increasing opposition from its trade union
rivals. Vo Van Tai, the militant who had been imprisoned by General Loan
during the labour tumult of early 1968, left the CVT shortly thereafter and
established the rival National Confederation of Labour (LCL) to challenge
what he saw as lethargy in the CVT. Obviously committed to aggressive
action (which Buu and other CVT leaders increasingly saw as needlessly
dangerous), in the summer of 1971, along with the Federation of Railroad
Workers, Tai attempted to launch a general strike to protest against rising
income taxes. While the two-day strike had little impact short of closing
some banks, Tai's militancy reminded some of the CVT's shortcomings. 89
Within the CVT, younger, more militant members complained of the
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organization's stagnation and charged Buu and the confederation leadership
with corruption - accusations not without some merit. Indeed, while
the CVT became increasingly involved in politics, contributing to some
impressive developments, a tendency to seek compromise and shy away
from militant trade union action increasingly plagued the organization. No
doubt, part of this reticence stemmed from anxiety about confronting the
Saigon government, both out of fear of a backlash and concerns that such
a challenge would only aid the Communist enemy.
The dilemmas of coexistence with the Saigon government in fact
grew more taxing as the war dragged on. In the wake of the 1972 Easter
Offensive, during which the North Vietnamese made impressive gains before
being repelled by American airpower, President Thieu declared martial law
and banned all strikes. Since its founding, the CVT regarded the right to
strike as an indispensable component of democracy. Nevertheless, Buu,
who had resolutely resisted such incursions in the past, chose to acquiesce
and support the ban. His action appeared to many a sad capitulation to
a corrupt, authoritarian government. Buu insisted the CVT was now on
the inside and needed to make sacrifices to maintain stability. "Now the
situation - the danger - is different", he explained. 90 With the imminent
departure of American troops, Buu now felt it necessary to stand with the
Saigon government, even as the CVT's Cong-Nong Party continued to
press for reforms.
With the announcement of the Paris Accords in January 1973, ending
the United States' direct participation in the war, Thieu seemed even
more determined to rein in labour - and all potential political opponents.
Without American leverage, Thieu felt no obligation to continue fostering
democracy. Reminiscent of Diem's Can Lao, Thieu announced the formation
of the "Democracy (Dan Chu) Party" and made it clear that it would be
the dominant force in South Vietnamese politics. Buu's refusal to join the
"Democracy Party" prompted a spiteful Thieu to launch a labour wing of
Dan Chu to compete directly with Cong Nong. 91 CVT officials recognized
the threat, viewing the Democracy Party's labour wing as a first step toward
creating a national labour union under Thieu's direct control. 92 Under the
surface, resentment smouldered, but Buu and other CVT leaders (to the
lasting bitterness of more militant members) resisted direct confrontation
with Thieu. Again, labour bent.
Paradoxically, as South Vietnam crumbled, the CVT's political
clout seemed to grow. Buu became an important ambassador/lobbyist to
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Washington, able to gain meetings with antiwar Democrats. By the fall
of 1974, he was using his leverage to criticize the government openly,
charging that it was "inefficient and corrupt". Both Thieu and the North
Vietnamese, Buu insisted, needed to dedicate themselves honestly to
implementing the Paris Accords. 93
In Saigon's final hours, Buu travelled to Washington in March 1975
for one last desperate round of lobbying, meeting with President Gerald
Ford and Senator Edward Kennedy. "Give us sufficient aid to survive. Do
not let us die slowly, agonizingly," he pleaded. 94
Buu was wrong, of course; the death of South Vietnam would come
quickly - in fact, within a few short weeks. Buu managed to find a space
on the infamous American airlift, while key CVT leaders and their families
escaped out into the South China Sea on a barge. Floating toward safety,
the CVT refugees listened in grim silence as radio announcers read lists
of those wanted by victorious North Vietnam authorities; some heard their
own names crackle over the airwaves. In the vanquished city, an observer
noted constant activity at CVT headquarters as the new government moved
in, eager to use the compound for its own purposes. In the midst of the
bustle, for several days no one thought to remove a portrait of Buu from
the wall. 95

CONCLUSION:
LINKING THE PAST TO THE PRESENT
From its inception, the CVT walked a fine - and dangerous - line. While
extolling independence of action and autonomy from the state and all other
forces, it was compelled by circumstances to engage in compromising
alliances, especially with a succession of problematic Saigon governments.
In the late 1940s, French authorities had allowed the formation of what
became the CVT, in the hope that the organization might attract mass
support for the struggling colonial regime. Meanwhile, confederation leaders
sought to forge a militant and anticommunist labour movement without
falling afoul of the colonial government. After the French departure and the
division of Vietnam, the same treacherous pattern persisted. Buu and the
CVT leadership sought to work with the repressive Diem government, while
maintaining some level of independence. As a result, the organization was
tainted by association with the Ngos, and suffered at the same time from
government repression. Later, the CVT strove to work with the Americans
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and with the Thieu regime, going so far as to acquiesce in Thieu's ban on
strikes in 1972. Such compromises allowed the confederation to navigate
the dangerous shoals of South Vietnamese politics, yet tarnished the
organization in the eyes of many. What was left was a public perception
of dependence on outsiders - hardly the goal of an organization aiming
to establish itself as an independent voice for Vietnam's workers.
This labour history, however, certainly makes Vietnam fertile soil for
labour activism and agitation, to hibernate and re-emerge when the time
comes. During its brief existence, South Vietnam saw a remarkable number
of strikes, as hundreds of thousands threw in their lot with trade unions
and activism. The tradition of anticolonialism and militancy seems to have
lived on, to organize and challenge social and workplace injustices, though
two-and-a-half decades separate the experience of the CVT and presentday labour upheavals in Vietnam. While the vast majority of strikes have
occurred in the southern region, especially around Ho Chi Minh City,
participants are very unlikely to have memories of the CVT. Older workers
and union officials might have been activists in those tumultuous war years.
For instance, VGCL President Dang Ngoc Tung was a construction worker
in Saigon in the 1970s.96 Between 1975 and 2008 came the experiences of
war, collectivization, Doi Moi, globalization, and a population 60 per cent
of which is under the age of 30, yet parallels between the earlier movement
and current developments are evident. To paraphrase American humourist
Mark Twain, while history does not repeat itself, it frequently rhymes.
As in the early 1970s, inflation combined with soaring energy costs
have resulted in serious economic hardship and large-scale strikes. A
massive migration of rural peasants into cities took place during the second
Indochina War; similar migrations clearly contribute to challenges faced
by workers today. Employee complaints about corruption and being given
no time off for the Tet holidays are as familiar today as in the pre-1975
period. 97 Fiscal deficits and balance-of-payment concerns also plagued pre1975 South Vietnam, much as similar factors worry Hanoi today. However,
two intriguing commonalities standout: awkward labour-state relations, and
workers targeting foreign-owned enterprises.
That strikes and workplace protest would focus on foreign direct
investment (FDI) firms is no surprise. That is where the jobs are; since
the early 1990s, FDI has dramatically outpaced the growth of state-owned
enterprises (SO Es). As will be seen in several subsequent chapters, these
foreign, mostly Asian investors are also notoriously exploitative. Hence,
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the vast majority of strikes in Vietnam are directed at such foreignowned firms. Additionally, there is, as Irene Norlund has suggested, a
certain "political correctness" about strikes in a socialist country aimed
at intensively capitalistic firms. 98 Targeting foreigners, in a country with a
history of exploitation at the hands of outsiders, may both play into this
political correctness and reflect a continuing perception that SOEs are
more responsive to workers' needs. Concurrently, government officials
walk a fine line - seeking to continue attract foreign investment, while
pacifying worker discontent. 99 In a similar fashion, workers and trade
unions in the 1960s and 1970s targeted foreign employers and operations,
especially American-owned firms and the U.S. military. Workers responded
enthusiastically, launching several thousand strikes in a few years.
Conversely, in the past the CVT and organized workers generally
avoided direct challenges or confrontations with the government. Trade
union leaders fully understood the dangers inherent in challenging the
state. The events of 1968, when several labour leaders found themselves
gaoled, certainly reinforced the wisdom of focusing on outsiders rather
than challenging one's own government. A working relationship with
the state - particularly with the Labour Ministry and other government
offices - was imperative. Beyond this, the CVT's philosophy from its
earliest days stressed corporatist labour relations and systematic cooperation
between unions, the state, and employers. The CVT strove to establish
such a working relationship with a host of Saigon governments; the results,
however, were decidedly mixed.
Today's Vietnamese General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) is
obviously much more closely associated with the state and Communist
Party. 100 Without question, the Vietnamese state has a great deal invested
in a globalized economy; strikes and labour agitation already have made
foreign firms wary of Vietnam. The VGCL finds itself uncomfortably
between its government and an increasingly angry workforce. 101 The Party
and police today have more capacity to infiltrate and neutralize illegal
unions than was the case under Ngo Dinh Diem or Nguyen Van Thieu in
South Vietnam.
Despite the legitimate discontent of some of its members, the VGCL,
like the CVT before it, has not been ineffectual in pursuing workers'
interests. 102 VGCL officials have not been silent as pressure builds. In autumn
2008 at a Hanoi conference on labour protection, confederation leaders
blamed the recent wave of strikes on employers who flout labour laws
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and disregard commitments made to workers. Officials also acknowledged
"some shortcomings in the State's management of the issue". 103 At the
Hanoi conference, Truong Lam Danh, deputy chairman of the HCMC City
Federation of Labour, bemoaned strikes prompted by employers' "broken
promises". 104 Still, as with the case of the CVT a generation earlier, workers
have ample reason to doubt the state-controlled VGCL's absolute dedication
to their interests. Workers frequently call wildcat strikes, circumventing
the confederation.
Tran Quoc Buu and other leaders of the pre-1975 South Vietnamese
labour movement insisted that trade unions must be independent of the
state (even as they habitually compromised their autonomy). Today, in
some circles, critics of the VGCL have made tentative steps toward forming
independent trade unions. 105 Such initiatives, however, have met with swift
reprisals from the state. In 2006, authorities sentenced eight activists involved
in organizing independent trade unions to prison terms. 106
Given the long history of the socialist state in Vietnam and its
persistence despite globalization, however, the VGCL is unlikely to be
challenged by independent trade unions. While the state has an obvious
stake in expanding and facilitating FDI, it remains rhetorically committed
to creating a "civilised and equitable society". 107 Workers and the VGCL
have played off that premise and, linking up with the lingering distrust
of foreigners and capitalism, have made such gains as the recent increase
of the minimum wage.
The militancy of today's Vietnamese workers would hardly surprise
the leaders of the CVT, who witnessed the dramatic proliferation of
strikes and worker action during the 1960s and 1970s. They would also
certainly recognize and perhaps even sympathize with the VGCL as it
struggles with limited success to give voice to worker discontent. A host
of debilitating dilemmas burdened the confederation. Yet, in the words of
Melanie Beresford, the "voice of the poor" may still "offset the growing
influence of public-private business networks." 108
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3
STATE ENTERPRISE WORKERS
"Masters" or "Commodities"?
Michael Karadjis

The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) claims to be still running a socialistoriented political system, and continues to cite the state economy as a key
sector in the country's development. There has been an ongoing debate
between the more socialist-oriented wing of the party, which advocates
retaining significant state ownership throughout the economy, and the more
market-oriented wing, which wants majority state ownership only in areas
such finance and infrastructure while leaving the rest to the private sector.
By examining one aspect of the state sector that can be considered an
essential element of the CPV's "socialist orientation" - worker participation
in management - this chapters seeks to interpret this debate.
In line with Leninist ideology, the CPV officially claims that workers
must become "masters in social production". 1 However, as in other
communist regimes that have diverged from their democratic ideals, making
Vietnamese workers complete "masters" seems to be an impossible goal.
In the pre-reform era, one may be led to assume that, like the Soviet and
Chinese models it outwardly resembles, the Vietnamese state was totalitarian
and thus had complete control over society, state enterprises, and workers
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